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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL RIGHTS-STATE'S FAILURE TO
PROTECT CHILD FROM KNOWN ABUSE DOES NOT TRIGGER LIA-
BILITY UNDER SECTION 1983. DeShaney v. Winnebago County De-
partment of Social Services, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
Joshua DeShaney was born in 1979 in Wyoming.1 The next year
his parents divorced. The court granted custody to his father, Randy
DeShaney, who moved to a city in Winnebago County, Wisconsin,
taking Joshua with him.2 There Randy DeShaney soon remarried.
Joshua's mother remained in Wyoming. 3
In January 1982 when Randy DeShaney and his second wife di-
vorced, the Winnebago County authorities first learned that Joshua
might be a victim of child abuse. Randy's second wife reported to the
police that Randy had previously "hit the boy causing marks and
[was] a prime case for child abuse." 4 In an interview with the Winne-
bago County Department of Social Services (DSS), Joshua's father
denied the accusations. The DSS did not pursue them further.5
In January 1983 Joshua was admitted to a local hospital with
multiple bruises and abrasions.6 Suspecting child abuse, the physician
notified the DSS, which obtained an order from a Wisconsin juvenile
court placing Joshua in the temporary custody of the hospital.7 Three
days later, the county convened a "Child Protection Team" to con-
sider Joshua's situation.' After deciding that there was insufficient
evidence of child abuse to retain Joshua in the custody of the court,
the Team recommended several measures9 to protect Joshua. Randy
1. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1001 (1989).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. The team consisted "of a pediatrician, a psychologist, a police detective, the
county's lawyer, several DSS caseworkers, and various hospital personnel .... " Id.
9. Id. These measures included "enrolling [Joshua] in a preschool program, providing
his father with certain counselling services, and encouraging his father's girlfriend to move out
of the home." Id.
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DeShaney voluntarily promised to cooperate with the DSS in accom-
plishing these goals. The juvenile court dismissed the case and re-
turned Joshua to the custody of his father.' ° A series of suspicious
events followed."
On March 8, 1984, Randy DeShaney beat Joshua so severely that
he caused brain damage. 12 Emergency surgery revealed evidence of
previous severe injury to the head.13 The prognosis was that Joshua
would need to spend the remainder of his life in an institution for the
profoundly retarded."I
Joshua and his mother brought this action under title 42, section
1983 of the United States Code' 5 against Winnebago County, its De-
partment of Social Services, and various individual employees of the.
Department.' 6 The complaint alleged that Joshua was deprived of his
liberty without due process by the respondents.' 7 The respondents
prevailed on a motion for summary judgment. 18
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating
two reasons for the failure of the petitioners to make an actionable
section 1983 claim.' 9 First, "the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment does not require a state or local government en-
tity to protect its citizens from 'private violence .... 20 Second,
"the causal connection between respondents' conduct and Joshua's
injuries was too attenuated to establish a deprivation of constitutional
rights actionable under § 1983. 121
10. Id.
11. Id A month later, the DSS caseworker handling Joshua's case received a call from
the emergency room reporting that Joshua had once again been treated for suspicious injuries.
During the next six months, the caseworker made monthly visits to the DeShaney home, not-
ing suspicious injuries on Joshua's head and that Randy had not complied with the Team's
recommendations. The caseworker also recorded her suspicions that someone in the house-
hold was physically abusing Joshua, but did nothing more. Id.
In November 1983 the emergency room notified DSS once again that they had treated
Joshua for injuries related to child abuse. On the caseworker's next two visits to the
DeShaney's home, Randy's girlfriend told her that Joshua was too sick to see her. Still, the
DSS took no action. Id. at 1001-02.
12. Id. at 1002.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). This statute imposes liability on the individual acting under
color of state law when he "subjects ... any citizen ... or other person... to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." Id.
16. 109 S. Ct. at 1002.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari22 and af-
firmed the decision. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
The fourteenth amendment 23 is generally considered to be a limi-
tation on the state's power, not a guarantee of protection by the
state. 24 As stated by Judge Posner in Jackson v. City of Joliet,25 "[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment . . . sought to protect Americans from op-
pression by state government, not secure them basic governmental
services."26
In 1871 Congress enacted section 1983 to implement the four-
teenth amendment.2 7 Congress designed section 1983 not only to pre-
vent states from violating the amendment, but also to compensate
individuals for deprivation of their federal rights.28 Originally, this
section, interpreted as applying to direct oppressive action by the
state, was little-used. 29 In recent years, courts have expanded the
meaning to include deprivation of constitutional rights caused by ac-
tions indirectly tied to the state. 30 This expansion has led to a sizeable
increase in both the number of section 1983 cases and the types of
state action that might lay the foundation for a section 1983 claim.3'
A section 1983 action requires a two-fold analysis.32 The first
22. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 108 S. Ct. 1218 (1988).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... "
24. See Currie, Positive and Negative Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986) (discusses
German decisions finding affirmative government duties based on provisions similar to those of
the United States Constitution and how American courts might also find affirmative govern-
ment duties); Comment, Actionable Inaction: Section 1983 Liability for Failure to Act, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1048 (1986) (criticizes the use of tort law in determining liability under § 1983).
25. 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1983).
26. Id. at 1203.
27. S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, THE LAW OF SEC-
TION 1983 (2d ed. 1986). Section 1983 began as section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April
20, 1871, which was entitled, "An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States, and for Other Purposes." Id. at 4.
28. Id.
29. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 554 n.13 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). See also
Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 6 (1980) (discusses the effect of the in-
crease in section 1983 cases caused by allowing recovery for section 1983 claims even when
there is also a remedy under state tort law).
30. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 554 n.13.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 535. In Parratt the Court held that the respondent was deprived of property (a
$23.50 hobby package) by persons acting under color of state law (prison officials). Id. at 536-
37. However, he had not established a section 1983 claim because the deprivation was a result
of failure of the state officials to follow established state procedures. Id. at 543. The Court
observed that the respondents would have a remedy under state tort law. Id.
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inquiry is whether a person acting under color of state law committed
the infraction.33 Second, the court must decide whether that conduct
deprived a person of rights protected by the Constitution.34 Only af-
ter the court answers these questions affirmatively is the issue of
whether the deprivation occurred without due process of law
addressed.35
In recent years, courts have struggled with whether a person act-
ing under color of state law caused the deprivation when the constitu-
tional violation resulted indirectly from that person's action.3 6 These
cases often involve a failure by the state to protect or render aid to the
complainant in a dangerous situation. 7
In Martinez v. California 38 the United States Supreme Court held
that deprivation of life by a dangerous parolee did not constitute a
section 1983 claim. 39 The Court emphasized that the parole officers
had no reason to believe that the victim was in special danger.4 The
fact that the murder occurred five months after the parolee's release
was another important factor in the Court's decision. Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Stephens stated, "it is perfectly clear that
not every injury in which a state official has played some part is ac-
tionable under [section 1983]. ' '42
Federal courts generally do not impose section 1983 liability
when the state only indirectly causes the deprivation by failing to pro-
vide protection or aid. 3 As stated in Bowers v. De Vito, 4 a Seventh
33. Id. at 535.
34. Id.
35. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1979); Winchenbach, Snake Pits and Slip-
pery Slopes: DeShaney Revisited, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1989, at 62.
36. Currie, supra note 24, at 866.
37. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (paroled sex offender who was negligently
released murdered Martinez's decedent); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984) (police officer failed to aid passengers in burning car);
Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982) (state released dangerous schizophrenic who
murdered Bowers).
38. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
39. Id. at 285. A paroled sex offender murdered Martinez's decedent. Id. at 280. The
parolee had been imprisoned with a recommendation of no parole. Id. at 279. Five years later,
overlooking certain requisite formalities, the officials paroled him. Id. Less than six months
later, the parolee murdered the decedent. Id. at 280. The court stated that the parolee was in
no way a state agent, and the decedent's death was too remote a consequence of the parole
officers' action to hold them responsible under federal civil rights law. Id. at 285. Therefore,
the appellants had not stated a § 1983 claim. Id.
40. Id. at 285.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Comment, Actionable Inaction: Section 1983 Liability for Failure to Act, 53 U. CHi. L.
REV. 1048 (1986).
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Circuit case similar to Martinez, there is "no constitutional right to be
protected by the state against ... criminals or madmen. ' '45
There are exceptions to the rule that states do not have an affirm-
ative duty to protect individuals from private action. In deciding
whether a case falls within an exception to the rule, courts rely on tort
principles.46 Under tort law, courts usually impose liability for non-
feasance47 only when they find a special relationship. Courts have
found that this special relationship exists when the injured party is
particularly dependent on the one failing to act, and the one failing to
act has "considerable power" over the injured party's welfare.18
The Supreme Court has also determined that this special rela-
tionship exists between the state and a victim when the victim is in the
state's custody. 49 In Estelle v. Gamble5 the Court held that the state
had a duty to render medical aid to those in prison.51 The Court
reasoned that by taking a prisoner into custody, the state had cut off
his other sources of aid, making him completely dependent on the
prison authorities. 52 This created the requisite special relationship
necessary to establish the duty to protect.53
Similarly, in Youngberg v. Romeo54 the Court stated that persons
involuntarily committed to mental institutions possess constitution-
44. 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
45. Id. at 618. In Bowers a schizophrenic, with a history of making knife attacks, mur-
dered Bowers by stabbing her to death. Id. at 617. Officials had released the killer from a
mental institution a year before the murder took place. Id. Stating that the "Constitution...
does not require ... the state to provide services, even so elementary a service as maintaining
law and order," the court affirmed the dismissal of the § 1983 complaint. Id. at 618-19.
46. Comment, supra note 43, at 1050.
47. Nonfeasance is a failure to take steps to protect one from harm. P. KEETON, D.
DOBBS, R. KEETON AND D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 373 (5th
ed. 1984).
48. Id. at 374.
49. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (prison environment); Davidson v. Cannon,
474 U.S. 344 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (prison environment); Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307 (1982) (state mental institution); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (prison
environment).
50. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
51. Id. at 103. In Estelle a prisoner brought a section 1983 case when prison officials
failed to provide appropriate medical treatment for a back injury. Id. at 98. The prisoner
contended that this constituted cruel and unusual punishment, violating the eighth amend-
ment, which is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 101. The
Court stated that "deliberate indifference" to prisoners' medical needs violates the eighth
amendment. Id. at 104.
52. Id. at 103.
53. Id.
54. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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ally protected interests 55 which the state has a duty to preserve.5 6 The
Court found that the custodial relationship formed the basis of a duty
to provide services.5 7
Even when a custodial relationship is present and deprivation of
a constitutionally protected right occurs as a result of a state agent's
failure to act, a court does not automatically find a section 1983
claim. Because Congress framed the fourteenth amendment to pro-
tect individuals from abuse of power by the state, the plaintiff must
show that the state's inaction amounted to more than mere negli-
gence. 9 As stated in Daniels v. Williams," "[flar from an abuse of
power, lack of due care suggests no more than a failure to measure up
to the conduct of a reasonable person."61 This level of misconduct is
not sufficient to establish a section 1983 claim. It "simply does not
approach the sort of abusive government conduct that the Due Pro-
cess Clause was designed to prevent."62 To state a section 1983 claim,
the plaintiff must establish that the actor exhibited "deliberate indif-
ference" to his needs.63
The Supreme Court recognizes an affirmative duty on the part of
the state to provide for the needs of those involuntarily incarcerated
or committed by the state.' Breach of this duty rises to the level of a
violation of an individual's rights when it is committed with deliberate
indifference.65 The Court has yet to specify what noncustodial rela-
tionships might create a duty on the part of the state to provide cer-
tain services.
Though not finding a special relationship to be present in Marti-
nez, the Supreme Court did, for the first time, indicate that a special
55. Id. at 324. The Court listed these constitutionally protected rights as "interests in
conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and
such training as may be required by these interests." Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Comment, supra note 43. Even when courts find that the state has a duty to protect a
certain individual, that individual must be able to show that the state actor exhibited "deliber-
ate indifference" to his needs to establish a § 1983 claim. Id. at 1053. See also Winchenbach,
supra note 35. Winchenbach notes that liability is imposed on the state for failure to provide a
constitutionally required service if the "professional practices [were] so far below generally
prevailing professional standards that deliberate indifference was indicated." Id. at 64.
59. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332
(1986); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
60. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
61. Id. at 332.
62. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 347-48.
63. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
64. Id. at 103.
65. Id. at 104.
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relationship may be found outside the custodial environment.6 6 The
Court, however, failed to give further guidelines on how to recognize
this "special relationship." The failure to define which relationships
give rise to an affirmative duty to protect has led to differences of
opinion on when this relationship is present.67
In determining whether a special relationship exists between the
state and the complainant, a court may look at several factors.68 In
Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department69 the court stated that while
"mere knowledge" of an individual's danger does not establish a spe-
cial relationship, such a relationship may be found in noncustodial
situations. 70 Because the state had issued a restraining order to keep
Balistreri's estranged husband away from her and had been notified
on several occasions of her plight, the court found that a special rela-
tionship existed.7' This imposed an affirmative duty on the state to
protect Balistreri from her attacker. 7  The court based its decision on
the fact that the state had affirmatively committed itself to the protec-
tion of the plaintiff and exhibited reckless indifference to her safety.7 3
66. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1979).
67. Compare Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding a
special relationship establishing a duty to protect Balistreri from her former husband) with
Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714 (1st Cir. 1986) (finding no special relationship
when the state released an inmate on furlough knowing that he was threatening to kill the
specific victim that he did kill).
68. Balistreri, 855 F.2d at 1425. The factors to be considered are:
(1) whether the state created or assumed a custodial relationship toward the plaintiff;
(2) whether, the state was aware of a specific risk of harm to the plaintiff; (3) whether
the state affirmatively placed the plaintiff in a position of danger; or (4) whether the
state affirmatively committed itself to the protection of the plaintiff.
Id.
69. 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988).
70. Id. at 1426.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1423. On February 13, 1982, Balistreri was beaten by her husband. Police
responding to her call removed her husband from the house, but refused to arrest him. The
police did not offer medical assistance, though Balistreri needed treatment for injuries to her
nose, mouth, eyes, teeth, and abdomen. Throughout 1982, Balistreri continually notified the
police that she was the victim of vandalism and harassing phone calls which she believed were
being committed by her husband whom she was now divorcing. In November 1982 Balistreri
obtained a restraining order enjoining her ex-husband from having any contact with her. Sub-
sequent to the restraining order, her ex-husband drove his car into her garage door. Balistreri
called the police, who came to her house, but refused to arrest her ex-husband or investigate
the incident. When a firebomb was thrown through one of Balistreri's windows in March of
1983, the police took 45 minutes to respond to her "911" call. After asking Balistreri's ex-
husband a few questions, the police determined he was not responsible for the act. Balistreri
was harassed and vandalized throughout 1983-85, during which time the police rendered little
or no aid. As a result, she suffered physical injuries, a bleeding ulcer, and emotional distress.
Id.
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Not every circuit agrees that a special relationship exists in a sit-
uation in which the state has committed itself to the protection of an
individual. In Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley74 the state had imprisoned
an individual found guilty of making threats on Gilmore's life. 75 The
prisoner, released on furlough, kidnapped and murdered Gilmore. 6
Citing Martinez7 7 as opening the door to new situations establishing
an affirmative duty to act, the court found that no such situation ex-
isted when the state merely had knowledge that this specific victim
was in special danger. 78 The court relied on the fact that the parolee
was not a state actor.7 9 The court did not address the issue of whether
the act of imprisoning the parolee was an undertaking to protect Gil-
more, thereby creating a special relationship.8"
Perhaps the clearest case of a special relationship, other than cus-
todial, is when the state places an individual in a position of danger.8"
Doe v. New York City Department of Social Services,82 which involved
the placement of children in a foster home, illustrates this concept.83
Comparing this case to the custodial cases and citing Estelle v. Gam-
ble, the court found the state liable for "deliberate indifference" to the
child's plight.8 4
The Eleventh Circuit did not reach the same result in Taylor v.
Ledbetter.8" The court refused to address whether it would extend the
rationale of Estelle outside of the prison environment and into the
foster home.86 The court reasoned that the state exercised less control
over foster homes, so it would not find "deliberate indifference" as
easily as in a prison environment.8 7
Courts have been hesitant to extend the "special relationship"
doctrine to situations involving the protection of children from their
74. 787 F.2d 714 (1st Cir. 1986).
75. Id. at 717.
76. Id. at 718.
77. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
78. 787 F.2d at 721-22.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982). "If the state puts a man in a position
of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say that its
role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake
pit." Id. at 618.
82. 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981).
83. Id. at 137. The city negligently failed to protect children who were repeatedly sexu-
ally abused by their foster father.
84. Id. at 141, 145.
85. 791 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 1986).
86. Id. at 883.
87. Id.
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parents.88 This reluctance probably arises out of a respect for family
autonomy and a fear of unnecessary state interference in parent-child
relationships.8 9
Courts that have addressed the issue of whether the state has an
affirmative duty to protect a child frequently use a Martinez type ap-
proach. These courts point out that Martinez was the first Supreme
Court case to suggest that an affirmative duty to protect could arise
out of a noncustodial relationship. 90 The question that has remained
unanswered by Martinez,9' which has led to diverse decisions, is what
exactly constitutes that type of special relationship.92
The Third Circuit concluded in Estate of Bailey v. County of
York 93 that a special relationship may exist where the county be-
comes involved in protecting a child from her mother and her
mother's live-in boyfriend, and then fails to do so adequately.94 In
vacating the lower court's dismissal of the case, the court stated that
this situation differed from the one in Martinez.95 Here the victim
was distinguishable from the public at large.96 The court also cited a
Fourth Circuit case, Jensen v. Conrad,97 that suggested a special rela-
tionship could exist.98 The court noted that, on remand, the plaintiffs
88. Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 829 F.2d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 1987).
89. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (involving rights of natural father of child
born out of wedlock); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (ordinance making
it illegal for grandson to live with his grandmother was declared unconstitutional); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (recognized parents' fundamental interest in guiding their chil-
dren's future).
90. Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510 (3rd Cir. 1985); Jensen v.
Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 191 (4th Cir. 1984).
91. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
92. Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 1987).
93. 768 F.2d 503 (3rd Cir. 1985).
94. Id. In this case Aleta Bailey's relatives notified the county workers that Aleta was
being abused. Id. at 505. A county worker took Aleta to the hospital where a physician
informed her that Aleta should be taken from her mother in order to prevent further abuse
from the mother's boyfriend. A county worker placed the child in her aunt's custody for 24
hours so that her mother could make living arrangements that would deny the boyfriend ac-
cess to Aleta. The next day Aleta was returned to her mother. The county failed to investigate
the living arrangements of Aleta, her mother, and her mother's boyfriend, and all continued to
live together. One month later, Aleta died from abuse inflicted by her mother and her
mother's boyfriend. Id.
95. Id. at 511.
96. Id. at 510.
97. 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984). This case involved two different § 1983 claims with
facts similar to those in Estate of Bailey. Id. at 187. In both cases county workers were aware
of the child's dangerous situation. Id. at 187, 188. In each case the worker undertook to
protect the child, then did so with blatant disregard for his safety. Id. Both children died from
abuse. Id.
98. Id. at 194. The court found that in light of the post-Martinez cases, the facts of this
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would have to prove "deliberate indifference" to the child's needs.99
The Eighth Circuit chose not to follow the approach taken by the
Third Circuit in Bailey.'°° In Harpole v. Arkansas Department of
Human Services, '0 ' a case involving suspected neglect of a child, the
court of appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of a section 1983
action.° 2 The court concluded that the Department of Human Serv-
ices did not create a special relationship by investigating the situation
and returning the child to his mother. °3 The Eighth Circuit thus
refused to extend the "special relationship" beyond the prison
environment. "O
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a state has an
affirmative duty to protect a known child abuse victim for the first
time in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Serv-
ices. '5 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began his
analysis by noting that the due process clause is a limitation on the
state's power to act. 6 The purpose of the clause is to protect people
from the state, not to ensure that the state protects people from each
other. 1 7 The due process clause does not bestow on the public an
affirmative right to aid from the state.' The majority summarized
the general rule by stating that "[i]f the Due Process Clause does not
require the State to provide its citizens with particular protective serv-
ices, it follows that the State cannot be held liable under the Clause
for injuries that could have been averted had it chosen to provide
them."' "
Citing Estelle v. Gamble and Youngberg v. Romeo, the petitioners
contended that the state had assumed a special relationship with
Joshua," 0 giving rise to an affirmative duty to protect him."' The
case could give rise to an affirmative duty to protect. Id. However, the court affirmed the
dismissal on the basis of good faith immunity. Id. at 195. The incidents had occurred one year
prior to the Martinez decision. Id. at 194.
99. Estate of Bailey, 768 F.2d at 508.
100. 768 F.2d 503 (3rd Cir. 1985).
101. 820 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1987).
102. Id. at 928.
103. Id. at 927.
104. Id.
105. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
106. Id. at 1003.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1004.
110. Id. The petitioners argued that such a relationship existed because the state knew that
Joshua faced a special danger and had proclaimed, by word and deed, an intention to protect
him.
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Court rejected this argument, pointing out that these cases stand only
for the principle that an affirmative duty to protect arises when the
state takes an individual into custody against his will, thereby restrict-
ing his ability to protect himself." 2 In Chief Justice Rehnquist's view,
such protection is required because to do otherwise would transgress
the substantive limits set forth by the eighth amendment and the due
process clause." 3 He concluded that the "Estelle- Youngberg analysis
simply has no applicability in the present case." 114
Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that the state may have ac-
quired a duty to protect Joshua under state tort law, but its failure to
do so was not automatically transformed under the fourteenth amend-
ment into a constitutional violation."1 5 Neither mere knowledge that
a particular person was in danger nor the fact that the state once of-
fered him shelter gave rise to a "special relationship" triggering an
affirmative duty to protect. "16 Furthermore, the state risks incurring a
charge of intrusion into the parent-child relationship if it acts too
quickly. '
The Court held that there was no deprivation of constitutional
rights actionable under section 1983 because a state actor did not in-
flict the injury on Joshua and there was no "special relationship" cre-
ating an affirmative duty to act." 8 Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that the people of Wisconsin may change their tort law to im-
pose liability on the state and its actors for failure to act in a situation
such as this. 1 9 However, this should not be forced upon them by the
Court expanding the fourteenth amendment. 20
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Black-
mun, dissented. He argued that the Court erred in beginning its anal-
ysis with the idea that the Constitution does not impose an affirmative
duty on states to take care of their citizens. 21 On the contrary, the
analysis should begin by focusing on the action that Wisconsin had
111. Id. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See supra notes 50-53 and accompany-
ing text.
112. 109 S. Ct. at 1005. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). See supra notes
54-57 and accompanying text.
113. 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1007.
116. Id. at 1006.
117. Id. at 1007.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1008. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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taken with respect to Joshua.' 22 In his view, Estelle and Youngberg
both stand for the principle that the state has a duty to protect people
who are unable to help themselves due to state action. 123 Using this
principle, Justice Brennan would extend the duty beyond the custo-
dial environment.124 He pointed out that the Court failed to recog-
nize that Estelle and Youngberg stand for the proposition that in some
situations the Constitution does establish positive duties, 125 citing sev-
eral cases from different constitutional contexts for support. 2 6
Justice Brennan would thus read Estelle and Youngberg as stand-
ing for the principle that once the state has cut off an individual's
private sources of aid, it has a positive duty to care for the individ-
ual.' 27 By this analysis Joshua would win. According to Wisconsin
law, private citizens, as well as government officials working in an
agency other than DSS, are to report suspected child abuse to DSS
and let DSS handle the situation.'2" After suspected child abuse has
been reported, Wisconsin's child protection program makes the child
entirely dependent on DSS for help. 129 Because the State actively in-
tervened, thereby cutting off Joshua's other sources of aid, 3° the dis-
sent considered that there was a duty similar to that in Youngberg and
Estelle on DSS's part to protect him.'
Having established that the state had a duty to protect Joshua,
Justice Brennan would have allowed the plaintiff an opportunity to
show that failure to help arose "from the kind of arbitrariness that we
have in the past condemned."' 3 2 He noted that inaction can be as
abusive of power as action. 33
Justice Blackmun, in a separate dissent, argued that this case is
not about inaction, but about active intervention in Joshua's life that
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1009.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1008.
126. Id. at 1009 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (striking down filing
fees as applied to divorce cases brought by indigents); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(striking down racially discriminative restrictive covenants); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939) (deciding that a local government could not entirely foreclose the opportunity to speak
in a public forum)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1010.
129. Id. at 1011.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1012.
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triggered a fundamental duty to protect. 3 4  According to Justice
Blackmun, rigid lines between action and inaction have no place in
interpreting the fourteenth amendment.135 The Court was wrong in
considering this a closed case based on legal precedent. Rather, this
question was an open one.' 36 The Court erred by not reading prece-
dent more broadly to establish a positive duty.'37
DeShaney effectively closes the door left open by Martinez.
While the Court suggested in Martinez that an affirmative duty to
protect may arise in situations that are not custodial and do not in-
volve the eighth amendment,' 38 DeShaney clearly indicates that the
Court is now unwilling to extend that duty into noncustodial cases. 39
However, the Court left open the question of whether a state
statute that requires an agency to protect victims from known abuse
may create an entitlement to aid."' ° Applying a Goldberg v. Kelly 14
analysis in this situation may lead to the conclusion that state laws
establishing agencies to protect children from abuse create an entitle-
ment to that protection. By failing to provide that protection, the
state deprives the child of a constitutionally protected interest.' 42
Adhering strictly to Estelle and Youngberg, Arkansas has refused
to extend the affirmative duty to protect beyond the custodial environ-
ment. I" At this point DeShaney seems to reinforce the law in Arkan-
sas, rather than to indicate a move toward the state having a
constitutional duty to protect once it has developed a protective rela-
tionship with an individual.
Sarah J. Hefley
134. Id. at 1012.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
139. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. 998.
140. Id. at 1003 n.2. The Court refused to address this issue because the petitioners failed
to raise it in the lower courts. Id.
141. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg the Court held that state statutes
providing for welfare benefits for qualified applicants created an entitlement interest. Taking
welfare benefits away from beneficiaries without due process violated a constitutional right to
these benefits. The constitutional right was solely created by statute. Id. See also Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
142. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.13 (West 1982) (provides for state protection of abused
children). Under Goldberg this could create an entitlement interest that could not be taken
away without due process.
143. Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1987).
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